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The delocation of firms is often viewed as a major outcome of a stiff 
environmental policy. In this paper, we study the impact of a strict anti-
pollution policy pursued by a government on domestic firms locational 
decisions and determine the main variables that interact with such a policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the most urgent subjects for international policy is the growing concern that 
expansion of the world economy will cause irreparable damage to the earth’s 
environment and a reduced quality of life for future generations. 
The external effects of economic activities have turned out to be of such importance 
that free market forces in the absence of environmental public policy will lead to large 
scale and irreversible environmental damage. As a consequence there is need for public 
policy to induce firms to internalise negative external effects. An example of such 
policies is the introduction of environmental taxes.
1 Many authors agree on the use of 
this measure, even because taxing “bads”, such as pollution, it is considered as an 
alternative to tax “goods” (work, savings, investment). 
As to environmental taxes, a crucial topic is the impact they have on firms’ decision. 
Firms decide where to localise or delocalise their production by considering the 
environmental policies among other things. This means that these policies affect both 
environment quality and production and employment levels within a region (nation). 
Therefore, national governments could face a potential trade off between production 
and pollution, which could trigger tax competition phenomena, as well highlighted in 
the literature (see Oates (2001) for a survey). 
The effects of environmental policy on plant location has been studied by Markusen 
et  al. (1993, 1995), Motta and Thisse (1994), Ulph (1994), Rauscher (1995), Hoel 
(1997), Ulph and Valentini (1997), Carraro and Soubeyran (1999) and Xepapadeas 
(2000). 
In all the papers referred to above the analysis is set up in a two country, or two 
region, context, with countries using environmental taxation as the policy instrument, 
either cooperatively or non-cooperatively. The present paper adopts a similar 
framework, but our approach differs from all these papers in that we assume polluting 
firms with different technologies (i.e., firms have different emissions abatement costs).
2  
We develop a simple model to explain firms’ location decisions when unilateral 
environmental policies occur. The hypothesis of different technologies implies that 
                                                 
1 Policy instruments to reduce pollution can be divided in two groups: market-based instruments 
(taxes, subsidies and tradable emission permits) and command-and-control instruments (design standards 
and performance standards). 
2 O u r  p a p e r  d i f f e r s  a l s o  i n  t h a t  w e  a s s u m e  t h e two firms do not take their location decisions 
simultaneously (see section 4), as, instead, it is commonly assumed in the existing literature on this topic.  
firms react in a different way to the introduction of environmental taxes. The expected 
result is that more polluting firms will have a greater incentive than less polluting ones 
to delocalise their plants in the region which has no environmental tax or where this tax 
is lower. By this model it is also possible to study how the welfare of the region, in 
which the environmental tax has been imposed, changes on the basis of firms and 
government decisions. We show that unilateral environmental policies can be welfare 
improving. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. 
Section 3 derives Cournot-Nash equilibria in the two markets. Section 4 considers the 
issue of the optimal location choice by firms in response to the environmental policy 
enforced by government. In section 5 we analyse the alternative strategies government 
can adopt and the possible effects on welfare. The final section summarizes the results. 
 
 
2.  The model 
 
Consider a two region (i = A, B), two firms (j = 1, 2) economy. Both firms are 
initially located in region A and produce a homogeneous good. They compete à la 
Cournot-Nash in the two markets. For both firms production leads to emission of the 
same pollutant. This pollutant causes only local damage. 
Each firm’s cost function can be written as ( ) ϑ , q c , where q is the output and ϑ  is 
the chosen level of pollution abatement.
3 We assume that the cost function is linear in 
output and level of pollution abatement 
 
()
2 , ij ij ij ij j ij ij cq q q ϑα β ϑ =+                                                                                   (1) 
 
For each firm, marginal costs are given by  ij jϑ β α
2 + , where  j β  is a firm-specific 
parameter. It is assumed that these marginal costs are constant and proportional to 
pollution abatement levels. 
Firms have different emissions abatement costs. Asymmetric cost structure can be 
allowed for, as the introduced β -parameters may differ across the firms (see Nannerup, 
                                                 
3 As in Motta and Thisse (1994) we assume that the fixed costs are sunk when the game begins. 
Hence, firm j does not have to incur any fixed costs when it operates its domestic plant in A.  
2001).
4 Firm emission of the pollutant is taken to be proportional to production and 









=                                                                                                                (2) 
 
When a firm exports it bears a trading cost per unit of output equal to τ , where 
01 τ ≤≤ . 
Finally, if firm j decides to establish a plant in region B, it incurs a set-up cost 
() 1 F ≥  which is independent of the volume of output. 
The market inverse demand functions are linear and symmetric 
  
() i i i Q S p − = 1                                                                                                      (3) 
 
where  i Q  is the total output sold in region i by the two firms,  i p  is the corresponding 
market clearing price and  i S stands for region i’s market size. 
() () ϑ , q z D  is an environmental damage function and is assumed to have the standard 
properties  () 0 0 = D  and  0 > ′ D  
 
() () ij iz q z D η ϑ = ,                                   (4) 
 
where  0 > i η  is a parameter which denotes the effect of one unit of emission in region i 
on the environment of the region. 
 
 
                                                 
4 A “high” β -value implies “high” expenditures in raising the output-emission ratio in production 
(
ij ij z q ) (Nannerup, 2001). Hence, a firm having a “high” β -value would choose a low level of 
pollution abatement. 
5 The specification of abatement costs and emission is based on Kennedy (1994).  
3.  The Cournot-Nash equilibria 
 
In the absence of any environmental regulation, each firm will set  0 , = j i ϑ  i.e. firms 
will not engage in abatement. In this case, letting  j Π  denote firm j’s profits, the 
following optimization problem is solved: 
 
j i j i j i i
q




max τ α − − = Π                               (5) 
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1 τ α α − −
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= Π                               (7) 
 
We now consider the case when the government of region A decides to impose a tax 
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j i j i t ϑ β =                                                                                                           (10) 
 
Eq. (10) shows that for firm j the optimal abatement effort is given by the point where 
marginal abatement costs equal the marginal saving in emission taxes. Moreover, it 
follows from (2) and (10) that smaller is the value of 
2
j β  bigger are the profits for firm 
j.
6 
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   (12) 
 
and the profits earned by firm 2 are 
 
                                                 
6 To make this statement more clear, it can be useful to rewrite the Eq. (10) in the following form 
2 2







































































  (13) 
 
We have shown that the smaller is the value of 
2
j β  the bigger are the profits for firm 









2 Π < Π ). In this case firm 2 could have first an incentive to move in region B, which 
do not adopt anti-pollution policies. We illustrate this case in the next section. 
 
 
4.  Optimal location choice 
 
Now we consider the issue of the optimal location choice by firm j in response to the 
environmental policy enforced by region A’s government. As we have seen the effects 
produced by the introduction of the environmental tax on the two firms are not 
symmetric, because of the different costs structure. Therefore, we can assume that firm 
2 is the first one to assess whether to remain in the region of origin or move to region 
B.
7 That means to compare the profits earned by firm 2 under the two possible 
configurations: (i) both firms are in region A, denoted (A, 0) (ii) firm 2 moved to region 
B, while firm 1 is still in region A, denoted (A, B). Eq. (13) gives the profits in the case 


























































ϑ β τ α
     (14) 
 




2 A B A Π > Π , then firm 2 relocates its plant.
8 Hence, there exists a value of 
t for which firm 2 is moving to region B. This happens when  e t t 2 > , where  e t2  is the 
                                                 
7 The existence of scale economies at plant level makes it unprofitable to open a plant in region B and 
still operate the plant in region A. 
8  ( )
*
2 ,0 A Π  is given by the Eq. (13).  
value of the environmental tax for which firm 2 is indifferent whether moving or not. 

























e                                                                                (15) 
 
Assume that the value of the tax imposed by region A’s government is slightly 
higher than  e t2 , then firm 2 decides to shut down its plant in region A and to open a new 
plant in region B. What happens to firm 1? Is it moving or not? Again, we have to 
compare firm 1 profits under the two possible configurations: (i) firm 1 is still in region 
A, denoted (A, B) (ii) both firms are in region B, denoted (0, B). In the configuration 
























































ϑ β α τ
ϑ
ϑ β α
      (16) 
 
If firm 1 relocates its plant, its profits become 
 






















                       (17) 
 




1 Π > Π , then firm 1 relocates its plant, too.  




                                                 




2 Π = Π , then we solve for t . Note that 
B A , 1 , 1 ϑ ϑ =  and 
2, 2, AB ϑ ϑ = , as only the government of region A has imposed an environmental tax. Moreover, we assume 




β β =  (ii)  B A S S =  (i.e. we study the case where the two market sizes of A and B are 
identical). 



























e                                                                                   (18) 
 
Now what we want to show is that the relation  e e t t 2 1 ≥  is always true. Rearranging 
















=                                                                   (19) 
 
















































Comparing (19) with the analogous expression for firm 1 (Eq. (20)), we can state that 
the tax rate  1e t , for which firm 1 is indifferent whether to relocate or not its plant in 
region B, is always higher, given a sufficiently large market size, than the tax rate  2e t , 
for which firm 2 is indifferent whether to relocate or not its plant.
11 This point has 
important policy implications, to which we return in the last section. 
Fig. 1 displays the tax rates  1e t  and  2e t  with respect to the market size, in the case of 
low trade costs and low set-up costs. The main results emerging from the study of this 
                                                 
11 The detailed demonstration can be found in Appendix.  
figure are: (i) there is always a positive value of the equilibrium tax rate for firm 2; (ii) 
if the market size is not large enough, there is not a tax rate for which firm 1 would stay 




Figure 1. Equilibrium tax rate as a function of the market size S . The figure is drawn 




We find analogous results in the case of high trade costs and high set-up costs, even 
if there are some remarkable differences (Fig. 2). Firstly, as we expected, in this costs 
configuration we have higher value of the equilibrium tax rates. Secondly, the critical 
size of the market for firm 1 becomes huger.
12 
 
                                                 
12 Fig. A1 and Fig. A2, in Appendix, depict the other two possible costs configurations (low trade 
























































Figure 2. Equilibrium tax rate as a function of the market size S . The figure is drawn 




5.  The government’s strategies and the possible effects on welfare 
 
In this section we study the alternative strategies region A’s government can adopt 
and the consequent firms’ location decisions. As shown in Fig. 3, the government can 
impose a tax at a level (i) lower than  e t2  (ii) higher than  e t2 , but lower than  e t1  (iii) 
higher than  e t1 . There is also a fourth option: to preserve status quo and do not adopt 
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Figure 3. Alternative government’s strategies and firms’ location decisions. 
 
 































(A, 0)  (0, B)  (0, B) 
 
 
The interpretation of the two extreme cases ( e t t 2 ≤  and  e t t 1 > ) is straightforward: if 
the tax rate adopted is lower than  e t2 , both firms have not any incentive to relocate their 
plants (the only consequence is a production reduction); while if it is higher than  1e t , the 
optimal location for the two firms is in region B.
13 More interesting is the case in 
between ( e e t t t 1 2 ≤ < ). For firm 2, the more polluting firm, the best choice is always to 
move to region B, while for firm 1, the less polluting one, it depends on the market size. 
Up to a certain critical size, it will relocate its plant, too.
14 To be precise, we should say 
that, when market is “small”,  1e t  does not exist or, better,  12 ee tt ≡ , since, if firm 2 best 
choice is to move to region B, this is the best choice for firm 1, too. 
Which are the implications of environmental policies on welfare? We assume that 
the welfare of region A is the summation of consumer surplus, firm j profits, tax 
revenues and pollution costs. In the configuration denoted (A, 0), the welfare equation 
is the following: 
 
() ( ) ( ) A A A A A A z z z z t CS A W , 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 2 1 0 , + − + + Π + Π + = η                                     (21) 
 
                                                 
13 We assume that if  2e tt = , firm 2 does not move to region B, even if it would be indifferent towards 
the two locations. The same assumption holds for firm 1: if  1e tt =  it stays in region A. 
14 The critical market size depends on the values of the other variables (
2 ; ;;; AB FF α τβ ).   
where the first term is the consumer surplus, the second the profits earned by firm 1, the 
third the profits earned by firm 2, the fourth the environmental tax revenues, while the 
last term is the environmental damage caused by production.  
In the absence of any environmental tax, we have 
 
() ( ) A A A A z z CS notax W , 2 , 1 2 1 + − Π + Π + = η                                                       (22) 
 
In the case only firm 2 has relocated its plant, welfare is 
 
() ( ) ( ) A A A A z z t CS B A W , 1 , 1 2 1 , η λ − + Π + Π + =                                                    (23) 
 
where  1 λ <  is the share of repatriated profits. If both firms have moved to region B, 
welfare is 
 
() 2 1 , 0 Π + Π + = λ λ A A CS B W                                                                             (24) 
 
If the aim of the government is to maximise the regional welfare, which is the tax 
rate the regional authority should choose? Fig. 4 displays the welfare levels associated 
with four particular tax rates ( 0 t = ;  2e tt = ;  1e tt = ;  1e tt > ) with respect to the market 
size.  
Figure 4. Welfare as a function of the market size S . The figure is drawn for 




It is evident that adopting anti-pollution policies increases the regional welfare. Even 
in the case both firms have moved to region B (corresponding to the curve denoted 
() 0,B W ), the level of welfare is higher than the level reached when there is no 
environmental policy ( () notax W ).
15 The best strategy region A’s government could adopt, 
is introducing a tax  2e tt =  (the top curve in Fig. 4). If we analyse Fig. 5, drawn for high 
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Figure 5. Welfare as a function of the market size S . The figure is drawn for 




Our conclusions can not be general, since they depend on the particular functional 
form assumed for W  and on the values of the parameters, nevertheless they demonstrate 
that unilateral environmental policies can be welfare improving. 
Clearly, the impact of these policies particularly depends on the effects of the 
emissions on the environment of the region. Fig. 6 describes the case in which these 
effects are very negative. It is interesting to note that for a definite range of market 
sizes,  () () 0, , 0 BA WW > , which means that region A is better off when both firms relocate 
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Figure 6. Welfare as a function of the market size S . The figure is drawn for 





6.  Conclusions 
 
This paper examines location decisions of polluting firms with different emissions 
abatement costs when unilateral environmental policies occur. 
We show that adopting anti-pollution policies increases the regional welfare. Even in 
the case both firms relocate their plants, the level of welfare is higher than the level 
reached when there is no environmental policy. Our conclusions can not be general, 
since they depend on the particular functional form assumed for welfare and on the 
values of the parameters, nevertheless they demonstrate that unilateral environmental 
policies can be welfare improving. 
Furthermore, we show that the market size is a crucial variable which affects firms’ 
location choices. The tax rate for which the less polluting firm (firm 1) is indifferent 
whether to relocate or not its plant, is always higher, given a sufficiently large market 
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to relocate or not its plant; but when market is “small”, if firm 2 best choice is to move, 
this is the best choice for firm 1, too.  
Three other avenues are open for future research. The first is to add some 
asymmetries between regions in some key variables. The second is to add asymmetry of 
information between regions and/or firms. Finally, a possible spin off of this research 
would be to let the governments of the two regions compete in pollution taxes to attract 




The purpose of this Appendix is to demonstrate that  12 ee tt > . 
The proof is given in a number of steps: 


























=                                                                                                             (A1) 
 
Eq. (A1) implies  1 0 d > , that is 
1
2
S α τ >+ .
16 
 
















since  2e T  can not be negative. 
 
2)  The condition 
1
2









3)  For firm 1 we get  
 
                                                 
16 Note that T  can not be negative. Therefore, since  2 β  is always positive,  1 d  has to be positive, 
too.  
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since  1e T  can not be greater than T . 
 
4)  The condition  ()
2
12 3 2 dd d ≥+  must hold. This condition holds for values of S  
sufficiently great. For example: 
i.  6.7 S ∀≥ , for low trade costs ( 0.3 τ = ) and low set-up costs 
(0 ,1 . 2 AB FF == ); 
ii.  10.3 S ∀≥ , for low trade costs ( 0.3 τ = ) and high set-up costs 
( 0.7, 1.3 AB FF == ); 
iii.  7.4 S ∀≥ , for high trade costs ( 0.9 τ = ) and low set-up costs 
(0 ,1 . 2 AB FF == ); 
iv.  11.0 S ∀≥ , for high trade costs ( 0.9 τ = ) and high set-up costs 
( 0.7, 1.3 AB FF == ). 
 






ddd d −+= ;  
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Under the condition  ( )
2
12 3 2 dd d ≥+ , ν µ ≥ , which implies  12 ee TT > . 
  
Figure A1. Equilibrium tax rate as a function of the market size S . The figure is drawn 
for  2 0.5; 0; 1.2; 0.9; 1 AB FF α τβ == = == . 
 
 
 Figure A2. Equilibrium tax rate as a function of the market size S . The figure is drawn 
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